0.5 4.26 1.09 11,502 -18,523 19,124 -31,109 10,296 -17,318 14,026 -26,010 Table S1. Catch, the economic and income multipliers. The administrative countries included in each geographic region, the average annual total landed commercial catch, the economic and income multipliers from Dyck and Sumaila (39) , and the average annual catch and revenue loss to likely illicit trade for each of the two scenarios. 77 5, 263 9, 896 4, 695 5, 544 Myanmar 1, 605 0.85 0.32 200, 350 269, 768 200, 350 269, 768 Oman 187 1.02 0.25 5, 185 12, 596 1, 511 4, 958 Pakistan 664 2.16 0.58 125, 199 81, 528 87, 122 62, ,957 -214,929 190,354 -317,256 42,986 -128,957 63,451 -190,354 Table S1 . Catch, the economic and income multipliers. The administrative countries included in each geographic region, the average annual total landed commercial catch, the economic and income multipliers from Dyck and Sumaila (39), and the average annual catch and revenue loss to likely illicit trade for each of the two scenarios. Table S1 . Catch, the economic and income multipliers. The administrative countries included in each geographic region, the average annual total landed commercial catch, the economic and income multipliers from Dyck and Sumaila (39), and the average annual catch and revenue loss to likely illicit trade for each of the two scenarios. Table S1 . Catch, the economic and income multipliers. The administrative countries included in each geographic region, the average annual total landed commercial catch, the economic and income multipliers from Dyck and Sumaila (39), and the average annual catch and revenue loss to likely illicit trade for each of the two scenarios. Table S2 . Corporate tax rate and revenue by country. The administrative countries included in each geographic region, the corporate tax rate for the country from (56), and the average annual tax revenue loss to likely illicit trade for each of the two scenarios. Where a country's tax rate was not available the average tax rate for that region was used. Table S3 . Economic losses. Estimated average annual economic losses to the legitimate (formal) international trading system due to likely illicit trade in marine fish catch over the last decade of total reconstructed catch data (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) for two scenarios of assumed fractions of unreported catches being redirected to illicit trade. Both scenarios assume 50-80% of unreported industrial landed catches are being redirected to illicit trade, while the fractions of artisanal unreported landed catches being redirected to illicit trade ranges from 30-50% and 10-30% for scenario 1 and 2, respectively. These estimates are compared with previous estimates of illegal fishing by Agnew and colleagues (3), the Sea Around Us total landed catch (reported and unreported landings) and total landed value of commercial fisheries averaged over the same time period, and the FAO total landed catch averaged over 2005 -2014 
